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Admiral Stansfield Turner
Director of Central Intelligence
Address to Indianapolis Veteran Groups
16 February 1980

Thank you Senator Bayh. Thank you all for being here on this glorious, sunny, Indiana afternoon. As a fellow midwesterner, I always enjoy coming back to this part of the country. We who live and work in Washington sometimes begin to believe that everything written on the Eastern shore is true, and representative of the opinion in the rest of the country. In fact, it frequently is not. Consequently, it is a wonderful opportunity for me to have this chance to be with you and to tell you a little about the trends in intelligence activities today. Then I would be happy to respond to your questions and, hopefully, hear your ideas, suggestions and other thoughts about what we are doing or should be doing.

Over the past five years, the institution of American intelligence, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency, has undergone more public scrutiny than any intelligence organization in history. That it has survived so well this fundamental shake-up and overall public review is a tribute to the high quality men and women who constitute that community. It is also to the great credit of your senior Senator, Birch Bayh, that the Congress has played such a constructive and helpful role in bringing the American intelligence world back into balance. Senator Bayh served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 95th Congress and now, in the 96th Congress, he is that Committee's chairman. He is a strong and enlightened leader; one on whom I can depend to have done his homework, to ask piercing questions, and always to support what is best for the national security. I will say more a little later about the role of the Senator's committee and how important it is to us.

Let me go back to the issue of public scrutiny and the fundamental problem that past investigations have created. The problem is one of exacerbating the already difficult job of keeping secrets in the atmosphere of openness and inquiry which exists today.

The CIA is and should be the most secretive organization in our government. The fact that it has been opened to the public to the extent that it has, has been traumatic for those in intelligence. It has damaged morale. The typical intelligence officer, for example, feels that he is performing a difficult but a patriotic task which often requires great sacrifice on his part and on the part of his family. When he sees what he does in good conscience exposed, increasing the risks he must take, and is criticized in the

public media, he can reasonably feel that the country neither understands nor appreciates the sacrifices he is making. That is a tragedy, because I can assure you that the intelligence professionals this country is privileged to have are totally dedicated to you and to our country.

Public exposure also makes our job much more difficult. When adequate secrecy cannot be guaranteed, foreigners who spy on our behalf and the intelligence services of foreign governments which complement ours are much less willing to do so. I need not emphasize to this audience of individuals, who have dedicated themselves to the patriotic support of our country, that we simply must be able to collect good information about what is going on in the rest of the world if the United States is to have a sound and sensible foreign policy.

The world we live in is not the ideal world which we would like. More societies than not are closed and totalitarian. Not all countries are willing to tell us what they plan to do in advance of doing it, even if what they do may affect United States interests adversely. Look, for instance, at the the hostage situation in Iran; at the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Events all around the world confirm that, while we have always needed good intelligence, today we need it more than ever before.

Thirty-two years ago, when the Central Intelligence Agency was founded, we were the predominant military power in the world. We were independent economically and many, if not most, of the free nations of the world took their political cues from us. How different is today's world. We are one of several interdependent economic powers. We do not dominate the world's political scene. Small nations and large are activist and independent. We are much closer to military parity. In these circumstances, the leverage of knowing what is going on in the rest of the world is much more important than it ever was in the days of our economic, political and military superiority.

But, if we are to have good intelligence, we must also be able to keep national secrets. How then do we resolve the contradiction between this need for secrecy and the danger of any secrecy in a democratic society? Secrecy can lead to unidentifiable power. Power of any type can be abused, but unidentified power has a particular potential for abuse. How then can we provide our country with good intelligence and at the same time insure against abuse? On the one hand, we could underreact. We could simply assume that the relatively limited number of abuses of the past will not be repeated because different people are in government and because we are more conscious of the problem. On the other hand, we could overreact and apply such stringent controls on the intelligence process that we would handcuff ourselves out of business. Either course would be shortsighted.

We need to achieve a balance. The best way to achieve that balance is through a system of accountability. Accountability to the Legislative Branch of our Government, accountability to the Executive Branch, and even accountability directly to the American public. We have found that we can do this, and that we can do it in ways that will not diminish our necessary capabilities.

Let me first describe how we now account to you, the American public, directly. In the past, very little of what we did was ever made known to the public. So, public accountability was impossible. That is no longer the case. The public investigations, the Freedom of Information Act, the perseverance of the American press have all made American intelligence much more accessible to the public. In addition, for the past several years we have carried out a deliberate policy of being more open. We publish more, share more of the studies and estimates that we do whenever that can be done in unclassified form and without jeopardizing security. My presence here with you today, something that might not have been possible four or five years ago, is another earnest of our desire to keep the public as well as informed as we can.

But because we cannot share everything directly with the public, we have constructed two systems of surrogates for the public in overseeing intelligence activities. One is a series of accountability mechanisms in the Executive Branch. Let me initially focus on those involving the presidency.

First, the President has the Intelligence Oversight Board composed of three non-government members who investigate any allegations of wrong doing or abuse which anyone may present to them. This Board then reports directly to the President. Second, the President is informed of sensitive intelligence activities, and personally signs an approval for any covert action activity that we are directed to undertake. Finally, President Carter has strongly supported the concept that Congress be well-informed about our activities so that it too can carry out its oversight responsibilities. This attitude is vital to the whole process of accountability.

The other accountability surrogate is the Congress. Sometimes people are skeptical here, feeling that the record of the Congress is no better than that of the Executive Branch in overseeing intelligence activities. Yet the Congress is elected separately from the Executive and operates independently of the Executive, therefore provides a wholly separate check on our activities.

Being accountable to two branches of government provides, I believe, a reinforcing assurance. There are two committees in the Congress, one in each chamber, dedicated exclusively to this oversight task. One is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which Senator Bayh chairs. I assure you we are open and forthcoming with the Senator and his colleagues. I can assure you also that Senator Bayh and the members of his committee are probing and thorough in their review of our activities. Their questioning and their guidance, both in advice and in law, are indeed very helpful to us. After all, accountability that is exercised properly is healthy for any organization.

Accountability must also be internal. It must ultimately start and end with the people who do the intelligence work. Under the President's mandate, I have reorganized the CIA and the staff that guides the overall intelligence community to strengthen them and to assure improved control. Policy has been reshaped to conform with the changed national environment, the need for more vigorous oversight, and the demands of new intelligence requirements. Steps were taken, such as the well-publicized and often criticized reductions in personnel, to improve our personnel management. The objective was to invigorate the organization, to preserve the dynamism and challenge which have always attracted to the Central Intelligence Agency the best talent that this country has to offer. Rather than purging the Agency of its ablest and best, as some allege, this personnel reduction has opened the top of the organization to new ideas, to greater flexibility, and to a heightened sensitivity to the changed world in which we must operate. Plenty of able and experienced hands remain to lead the young chargers, I assure you.

Having laid out for you the fundamentals of ensuring accountability, the next logical question is, what has that done to our capabilities? Does the necessary balance exist between accountability and our capabilities to produce effective intelligence?

In his State of the Union address just a few weeks ago, President Carter said:

"Clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies is necessary. We will guarantee that abuses do not reoccur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence."

This statement recognizes the fulfillment of the President's commitment to intelligence reform.

The charter he is asking the Congress to enact will do three things: It will delineate what our authorities are, what we are authorized to do. It will delineate what restrictions are placed on us, what we may not do. And, it will codify the oversight process which will check on how well we are using the authority we are given and whether we are exceeding or ignoring the restrictions and the prohibitions that have been laid out.

Senator Bayh and his committee are blazing the trail in this regard. Last week they introduced charter legislation to the Congress. We all hope very much the Congress will act on this charter during the forthcoming session.

It is precisely because this system of authorizations, restrictions, and oversight procedures has proven so successful in the last few years that the President and the Congress can now contemplate lifting some of the restraints on intelligence activities. Frankly, following the investigations of 1975 and 1976, the government went a little overboard in restricting intelligence agencies. From the point of view of many, this was necessary since adequate oversight and control mechanisms did not then exist. Today they do. Now there will be no danger in lifting some of those shackles that disadvantage American intelligence activities.

Let me cite four examples for you. First is the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. This Amendment requires that whenever we undertake a covert action we report it to as many as eight committees of the Congress. Reducing that reporting requirement to the two intelligence oversight committees would greatly diminish the risk of leaks, which could endanger lives, without diminishing Congressional oversight.

Second is the Freedom of Information Act. This Act requires that, for every request for information we receive, we must search all of the CIA's files, including those which contain information about our most sensitive sources. Limiting that review primarily to finished intelligence from which the source information has been removed would go far to reassure important sources overseas that there is no chance of a deliberate or inadvertent release of information which could compromise them. Without this reassurance, they are becoming increasingly reluctant to cooperate with us because they fear their identities may become known.

Third, the discovery process in courts of law can require us to reveal more sensitive, classified information in open court to prosecute an alleged espionage case than was compromised in the first place by the accused. Often, rather than do this the government will drop the case. This is called graymail. It could be avoided if we legislate some protective rules which govern the use of classified information in espionage and other criminal cases.

Finally, we do not have adequate legislation today to deal with those few scurrilous people who deliberately disclose the names of CIA officers, agents overseas, informants and other sources of information.

Legislation for all four of these problems is either incorporated in the charters or is tabled before the Congress. We are very hopeful of their support in these directions in these next few months.

In conclusion, let me say that intelligence reform has taken place. American intelligence services operate under the informed control of the Executive and the Legislative Branches. No one is proposing today that, in lifting these restrictions, that be changed. However, we are moving today closer to the enactment of a permanent charter which will formally legislate the authority and the limits of our country's intelligence activities. The moment is right not only to reassure ourselves that the safeguards of our Constitutional rights and our civil liberties are firmly in place, but also to assure that we have balanced those guarantees against the practical imperative of maintaining the best intelligence arm of which we are capable.

It is not a perfect world. It is not an open world. It is a world in which we must balance idealism and reality. We must be sure that the check of accountability encourages idealism. We must also be sure that the check of accountability is made sufficiently flexible so that idealism can be tempered with realism. We are not there yet but we are moving strongly in the right direction. It is an exciting period, an important period in American intelligence. A period where we are, in effect, evolving a new, uniquely American model of intelligence; one tailored to the values and standards of our society, yet, one which is also designed to ensure that we remain exactly what we are today, the number one intelligence service in the world.

Thank you very much.

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Admiral Stansfield Turner
Informal Discussion/Questions & Answers
Leadership of Indianapolis Veteran Groups
16 February 1980

I appreciate your all turning out on this sunny, snowy, Saturday afternoon and I hope that I can just say a little bit on two subjects and then have a little informal exchange. I would like to get your thoughts, your suggestions, and ideas and try to respond to any of your questions.

I thought I would just speak a little bit about what I think is an interesting trend in the world around us. A little bit about more and more significant trends in the world of intelligence today. I think we are witnessing, in connection with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan a very interesting phenomenon, to wit, for the first time since World War II, I think we see the Soviet Union really on the defensive about something they have done. When we look back, they got away with the Berlin blockade; they got away with Hungary; they got away with Czechoslovakia but this time they bit off something different. I don't think they anticipate how difficult it was going to be for them. The amount of resistance they have encountered from the freedom fighters inside Afghanistan. Most particularly, it appears to me, they underestimated the amount of American, and general free world opposition to them. Today, they are internationally on the defensive particularly with respect to the many Muslim nations in the world, who take particular offense at their attempts to subjugate the muslim population in Afghanistan.

One of the reasons they may have underestimated, is that they have such a closed society and perhaps they don't understand as well what the rest of the world is thinking and saying. Another perhaps is because the world around all of us has changed in the last several decades. We have such instant and complete international communications. You just can't get away with things, the Soviets have tried to get away with before with everybody perceiving what was really happening. In addition, in the last decade, the so called Third World, the non-aligned nations of the globe have become more strident, more influential, more unified, and of course, some of those who produce large quantities of oil have real power in the world today.

We find ourselves in an interesting evolution where the Soviets have again tried something that leads to their subjugating a foreign people and this time they have run into a much more difficult situation than they ever have before. How it is going to work itself out, how they are going to extricate themselves from this position is going to be a fascinating development of international affairs over the months and years to come. We will all watch with great intensity. On the other subject of changes in the intelligence community, we are of course today very grateful for the general reversal of attitudes, the general appreciation of the importance of intelligence that is revived within the Country in recent months. There has never been any question of the kind of support, the organization represented here, have consistently given us throughout this period. Today, the pendulum of our Country which often swings a little bit too far in one

direction or the other is coming back to center, towards a more balanced recognition of the importance of what we do in accomplishing the good intelligence collection and analysis for our Country. In a large measure I think this is due to the fact that we have established much more regularized procedures for conducting intelligence and for overseeing the intelligence activities of our Country. In my formal remarks today I will go into that in some detail. Into the role Senator Bayh and his committee in the Senate play in the that. It has been a teamwork effort between the Legislative and the Executive Branch of our Country and I think a very conscious effort to renew public confidence, but at the same time to keep the strengths not to debilitate us by unnecessary rules and regulations but to ensure that we have that capability to do good the intelligence effort our country needs. I can assure you that we are doing it. I can assure you that it is in large measure because of the support we get from the Congress and the President. And, in the last analysis, because we are really blessed in this Country with a superb group of people who make up the intelligence community; the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Services intelligence organizations and a number of others. They have persisted, despite the public criticism, despite the problems that have been thrown in our direction in recent years in producing super intelligence for our Country and I think we can be very proud of them.

Let me not take more of our time here before we go next door. I would like to respond to anything you want to say or any questions you would like to ask, in this more private group.

Q. One of the measurements of your esteem is the ability to attract and bring in young people, both men and women that you need to carry on the work that is very important. Could you tell us how effective that is?

I know that you lost a lot of qualified, experience personnel recently in the last three years, and hopefully those talents are being replaced.

How successful is the Agency now in bringing people into the organization.

A. We are very successful. I think we are still getting the cream of the crop. We are getting more applicants than we can possibly take.

The interesting thing is, even in the periods 5-6 years ago during the most intense criticism the recruiting didn't drop off. Some of the so-called prestige universities in the East just fell off markedly.

The overall, I think, has improved for us in the sense that we have now moved out into more parts of the Country, more universities and colleges, but the quality of the people and the number of applicants has stayed up. I think that is really a testimony to the young people of this country who have seen through a lot of the talk and criticism.

I just want to take a minute to tell you a little sea story.

About two weeks ago, my office got a phone call. The person said, I am in one of the new career training class -boot camp we have for our new professional people - he said there are five of us down here who would like to have lunch with the Director. My office said what is your problem, what are you mad about or is there something you are going to try and come and beat on the Director. He said, no, we just want to meet the Director. Well, much to their surprise I accepted and we

had a lunch, just the five of them and myself. I only tell you all this background because I went away from that luncheon inspired. These were five people, all of whom had some experience after the university, three of them had graduate degrees, one a law degree. They had come into the Central Intelligence Agency because they wanted to be where the action was; they wanted to do something for their country; they liked the idea of being involved in international relations and they were just really fine young people and you and I would have been pleased, General, to have any one of them as part of our own family. I just floated out of that luncheon because I felt so good that despite all these other things, we have been able to continue to attract this kind of person.

Q. Admiral, I will say it for you, you might say that I feel that the organizations here represent inaudible
I think the criticisms and stigmas of a few years ago are unfounded. There might have been problems, but we still need the intelligence agency. Personally, as I see it, the Agency almost became stagnant because of this and they started these strangulation type of regulations and policies against you and the Agency, obviously you are living with them, but how is this legislation and do you anticipate any future legislation that is going to make your life more difficult to live with as far as the Agency is concerned?

A. No, we will talk about this in some detail later. We are very pleased with the legislative trust fund on Capital Hill today. Senator Bayh's committee has worked for three year now, intensively with us, to develop what is known as a charter for the intelligence community. Other members of the Senator's committee have tabled specific legislation to lift some of these burdens that are on us and the entire atmosphere on Capital Hill is markedly different today than it was even two or three years ago. We are very anxious to get the charter that the President has supported and Senator Bayh has proposed. The Charters will lay out for us what we are allowed to do. The old regulation of 1947 is really out of date, it doesn't describe intelligence activities of our country the way they are being carried out today. We need to correct that. They will also tell us what we are not supposed to do. The Senator and his committee have worked that out in what I think is a very judicious way. Mainly we will get guidance not law that tells us what we are not supposed to do. Then, the third part of the charter is an oversight process in which both the Executive and Legislative Branches check on us. In short, if you give me a very detailed regulation that says you cannot do this under any circumstances if it is a law, you can't do it. Then you find that some unusual circumstance arises and your hands are tied. The hostages situation is one. I have a regulation not to use and pay academics or newsmen to keep those professions out of the intelligence business under normal circumstances. Here we were in a situation where in one instance, I thought that a newsman might be able to find us

something that might be of great help to the hostage situation. You wouldn't want me not to have been able to pay his ticket to Teheran. If that had been in a law, I would have to go back to the Senator and the Congress to get permission. So, what we will set up will be guidance that generally we should not use a newsman or an academic if we could avoid it, but I would have the latitude to make exceptions when it was really in the national interest. Then the oversight committees can come to me and say, now, how many exceptions are you making Turner. Are you just making a farce out of this guidance we are giving you or are you carrying it out. That way, we have a combination of the flexibility that I need to get the job done and the oversight the Country needs to assure we are not abusing those privileges. So, I think we are just moving in the right direction in this legislative atmosphere today. We are very hopeful that before this session of the Congress concludes that we will have received relief on four or five different areas that are important to us.

Let me just add a postscript to that. Some of these regulations like the Freedom of Information Act, they have hindered our operations, but I would like to emphasize to you that I don't believe they have debilitated us, I believe we have been and are today able to do our job. The problem lies in the perceptions of these things like the Freedom of Information Act give to other people, and the confidence they have in us and if we don't get some of those corrected in the next year or so it may become debilitating. You see,

it takes a while for people to get the perceptions. For instance, you walk as a CIA officer down a dark street in some foreign country and you meet your agent and you say, please get this information for us and he says, well, that is sticking my neck out I may be in real trouble, and are you going to release my name under the Freedom of Information Act. You have got to look him back in the eye and say no, and inaudible. But, you have got to be honest with him too and say, there is just a little tiny fraction of chance something may happen. So, we want some relief from that, and I think we will be able to get it from the Congress this year, all indications that we have and it will be a tremendous boost when that happens. Today, while it has been nagging at us, it hasn't become a serious problem but it certainly will if this continues over time.

Q. There is going to be a world investigation on the Shah.

How much is the CIA going to be accused of?

A. I am sure that we will be accused of doing everything that was ever done bad in Iran. Clearly, it is not the case. On the other hand, if there truly is a reasonably impartial investigation of the Shah's regime, they will have to bring out that he did a lot of good things for his country. Clearly, he was basically unpopular and obviously he must have done some things that were not good in the people's minds. Nobody is today talking about the advance in education, the advance in the standard of living of the country that did come under his tenure. It is a cross we bear that CIA

gets accused of so many things. The most humorous of which recently is the initial Soviet explanation that they went into Afghanistan because the CIA was going to topple President Amin. Then when they were asked, why did you kill Amin- they said well that was because he was a CIA agent. So, we get accused in all directions and it really is fun and amusing to me to sit back in my office and pick up the paper and read what I just did yesterday in some foreign country. I often say to my friends, I sure wish I had the power to do some of those things. I just sort of like the world of James Bond when people make up these stories of what we are supposedly capable of doing in various places. I always say to people, that after I got settled in this job I was somewhat disappointed to find out it wasn't much like James Bond, my wife says she thinks that is alright.

Interestingly, there are some analogies between the popular book on spying activities and what we do. The one place that we come close to the James Bond type activities is in our scientific and technical collection of intelligence and you should know and be proud that the industry science of this Country produces for us some of the most amazing electronic and other gadgetry to collect intelligence information that you can imagine. It is a great strength for our country. James Bond has all kinds

of gadgets, fire guns from the back of his Maserati or put things out of the sides of the car to ram somebody else; we don't have much of that but we do have satellites, and listening post capabilities that really defy imagination as to what Americans can accomplish and keep us well ahead of any competition in this field. We do, of course, very much need and have a good human intelligence capability also, a spying capability. My part in it is not at all like James Bond. He makes decisions whether to jump out of an airplane without a parachute, his decisions are proved right or wrong very quickly. He either gets down or he doesn't. My decisions are, is the risk of this activity worth it? Is the value of what the country will gain by the information to be obtained worth the risk and the costs that we are going to undergo in exposing people, in possibly embarrassing the country. Those are difficult and painstaking and thorough decisions that have to be made, not in the James Bond heat of activity and not something you can be trained for, they are something you have to just defy your conscience or sense of guidance that you have from the President and the Congress on what the country's policies are, what the country needs and every night you go to bed, you hope you make the right one today. I find it as intellectually exciting as any James Bond movie, but not the same type of excitement that he enjoys in all of his activities. Is there anything else anyone would like me to comment on?

Thank you very much.

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Thank you Senator Bayh. Thank you all for being here on this glorious, sunny Indiana afternoon. As a fellow midwesterner, I always enjoy coming back to this part of the country. ~~You know~~ We who live and work in Washington sometimes actually begin to believe that all those things that are written on the Eastern shore are true, and representative of our country. When in point of fact they most frequently are not. It is a wonderful opportunity for me to have this chance to be with you and try to speak a little bit first about the trends in our intelligence activities today. Then respond to your questions and hopefully hear from you on ideas, suggestions and other thoughts you may have about what we are doing or should be doing.

I think perhaps the most significant trend I would like to emphasize about our intelligence activities today is that the institution of American intelligence over the past five years, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency has undergone more public scrutiny than any intelligence organization in history. That it has survived so well this fundamental shake-up and overall and review by the public is indeed a tribute to the high quality of the men and women who constitute that intelligence community. I believe it has survived, not only survived, but that it is more capable today than ever before. It is also a great credit to your senior

Senator, Birch Bayh, that the Congress has played such a constructive and helpful role in bringing us back into balance in the intelligence world. Senator Bayh, as he said, has served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 95th Congress and now in the 96th he that Committee's chairman. He is in my view a strong and enlightened leader; he is one on whom I can depend to have done his homework to ask piercing questions but always to do what is best for the national security. I will say more a little later about the role of the Senator's committee and how important it is to us.

Let me go back to the question of public scrutiny and the fundamental problem that these past investigations have created for us in the intelligence world, a problem of how can we keep our secrets in this kind of an atmosphere.

The CIA is and should be the most secretive organization in our government. The fact that it has been opened up to the public has been a traumatic experience for those of us in the world of intelligence. It has damaged morale. The typical intelligence officer, for instance, feels that he is performing a difficult but a patriotic task and it often requires great sacrifice on his part and on the part of his family. When he finds then that what he has been

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doing in good conscience is exposed and criticized in the public media, he can only feel that the country neither understands nor appreciates the sacrifices he is making. That is a tragedy, because I can assure you that the intelligence professionals the country is privileged to have are very dedicated to you and to our country.

The trauma I am speaking of public exposure, also makes our job much more difficult to accomplish. When adequate secrecy cannot be guaranteed, foreigners who on behalf of us and support our country and foreign governments who's intelligence services complement ours are certainly much less willing to do so. Now I need not emphasize to this audience who have dedicated themselves to patriotic support for our country that we simply must be able to collect good information about what is going on in the rest of the world if the United States is to conduct sound and sensible foreign policy. The world we live in is not the ideal world which we would like to have. More societies than not are closed and totalitarian. Not all countries are willing to tell us what their plans are and what they are going to do in advance of doing it, even if it may effect the interest of the United States markedly. Look for instance at the situation of all the stories and publicity on the hostages in Iran, on the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and how uncertain events are all around the world. Hence, I say to you that while we have always needed good intelligence I believe that today we need it more than perhaps ever before in our nation's history.

Thirty-two years ago when the Central Intelligence Agency was first founded, we were the predominantly military power in the world. We were totally independent economically and many if not most of the free nations of the world took their political cues from us. How different is today's world. We are one of several interdependent economic powers. We do not dominate the world's political scene for small nations and large are activist and independent. We are much closer today to military parity. These circumstances, the leverage of knowing what is going on in the rest of the world is much greater than it ever was in days of economic, political and military superiority.

If we are going to have good intelligence, we must have the ability to keep national secrets. How then do we resolve the contradiction between this need for secrecy and the danger of any secrecy in an open society? Secrecy can lead to unidentifiable power. Power of any type can be abused, but unidentified power has a particular potential for abuse. How then can we provide for good intelligence for our country and yet insure against abuse? On the one hand, we could underreact. We could simply assume that the relatively limited number of abuses of the past will not be repeated, because we have different people in our government, because we are more conscious of the problem. On the other hand we could overreact, and apply such stringent controls to the intelligence process that we would handcuff ourselves out of business. Either course would obviously be shortsighted. What we need is to achieve a balance. The best way to achieve that balance

is through a system of accountability. Accountability to the Legislative Branch of our Government, accountability to the Executive Branch and even accountability to the American public. We have found that we can do this and that we can do this in ways that do not handcuff our basic capabilities.

Let me first describe our accountability to you the American public. and how that has been created and structured. In the past, very little of what we did was ever made known to the public. So, public accountability was an impossibility. That is no longer the case. The many public investigations, the Freedom of Information Act, the perserverance of the American press have all made American intelligence today much more accessible. In addition, for the past several years we have had a deliberate policy of being more open with the American public. In particular, we are publishing more, putting out in unclassified form more of the studies and estimates that we do whenever that can be done without jeopardizing our secrets. My presence here with you today, something that might not have been possible four or five years ago is another earnest of our desire to keep the American public as well as informed as we can. Yet, you appreciate fully that the American public cannot know everything if we are going to protect our secrets.

What we have done is to construct two systems of surrogates for the public in overseeing our intelligence activities. One is a series of accountability mechanisms in the Executive Branch. Let me initially focus on those involving the presidency. The President, for instance,

has what is known as the Intelligence Oversight Board. Three members who are not part of the government, who investigate any allegations of wrong doing or abuse which anyone may present to them. This Board then reports to the President only and directly. The President also today is informed of sensitive intelligence activities and personally signs for any covert action activity that we are directed to undertake. President Carter, in particular has strongly supported the concept that Congress must be well-informed about our activities so that it too can carry out its oversight responsibilities and this attitude is vital to the whole process of accountability.

The other surrogate accountability then is the Congress. Sometimes people are skeptical here, feeling that the record of the Congress is no better than that of the Executive Branch in controlling intelligence activities. Yet the Congress is a body that is elected separately from the Executive and which operates totally independently of the Executive.

Accountability to two branches of our government provides, I believe, a reinforcing assurance. There are two committees in the Congress one in each chamber dedicated exclusively to this task of overseeing intelligence activity. One of these, of course, is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which Senator Bayh chairs. I can assure you that we are open and forthcoming with the Senator and his colleagues. I can assure you also that Senator Bayh and his other committee members are probing

and thorough in their review of our activities. I can assure you they are questioning their guidance both in advice and in law is indeed very helpful to us. After all accountability that is exercised properly is healthy for any organization. Accountability must also be internal. It must ultimately start and end with the people who do the intelligence work.

Under the mandate of the President, I have reorganized the CIA and the staff that guides the overall intelligence community of our Country in order to strengthen them and to assure improved controls. Policy has been reshaped to conform with the changed national environment, with a need for more vigorous oversight and with the demands of new intelligence requirements. Steps were taken such as the well-publicized and often criticized reductions in personnel. Specifically, though to improve our personnel management. The objective was to invigorate the organization. To preserve the dynamism and challenge which have always attracted to the Central Intelligence Agency the best talent that this country has to offer. Rather than purging the Agency of its ablest and best, as some allege, this step has opened the top of the organization to new ideas, to greater flexibility and to a heightened sensitivity of a changed world in which we must operate. Plenty of able and experienced hands remain to lead the young chargers, I assure you.

Having laid out for you the fundamentals of ensuring accountability, the next logical question I would like to tackle is - does the necessary balance exist between accountability and our capabilities for producing effective intelligence? In his State of the Union address just a few weeks ago, President Carter said the following:

"Clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies is necessary. We will guarantee that abuses do not reoccur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence."

This is the fulfillment of the President's commitment to intelligence reform. The charter he is asking the Congress to enact would do three things:

First, it will delineate what our authorities are, what are we encouraged and authorized to do; secondly, it will delineate what restrictions are placed on us what should we not do; and thirdly, it will create the oversight process which will check on how well we are using the authority we are given and whether there is any abuse of the restrictions and the prohibitions that are laid out.

Senator Bayh and his committee have blazed the trail in this regard and last week introduced the charter legislation to the Congress. We all hope very much the Congress will act on this charter during the forthcoming session.

restrictions and oversight procedures have proven so successful in the last few years that the President and the Congress can now contemplate lifting some of the restraints on our intelligence activities. Frankly, following the investigations of 1975 and 1976, the government went a little overboard in placing restrictions on intelligence agencies. From the point of view of many this was, necessary since the oversight and control mechanisms did not then exist. Today they do. Now there will be no danger in lifting some of those shackles that disadvantage American intelligence activities.

Let me site four examples for you. First is what's known as the Hughes-Ryan Amendment. This requires that we report to as many as eight Congressional committees whenever we undertake what is known as a covert action. Reducing that requirement to the two intelligence oversight committees would greatly diminish the risk of leaks, some of which could endanger human lives and yet would not harm the accountability process of the Congress. Second, we have what is known as the Freedom of Information Act. This Act requires that for each request for information that we receive we must search all of the CIA's files, including those which contain information about our most sensitive sources. Limiting that review primarily to what is known as finished

intelligence from which the source information has been removed would reassure important sources overseas who are becoming increasingly reluctant to cooperate with us because they fear their identities would become public. Third,

accused often rather than do this the government would drop the case this is what we call graymail. It could be avoided if we legislate some protective rules which govern the use of classified information in espionage and other criminal cases. Finally, we do not have adequate legislation today to deal with those few scurrilous people who deliberately disclose the names of CIA officers, agents overseas, informants and other sources of information. Legislation for all four of these problems is either incorporated in the charters or is tabled before the Congress and we are very hopeful of their support in these directions in these next few months.

In conclusion, let me say that intelligence reform has taken place. American intelligence services operate under the informed control of the Executive and the Legislative Branches. No one is proposing today, that in lifting these restrictions that be changed. However, we are moving today closer to the enactment of a permanent charter which will formally legislate the authority and the limits of our country's intelligence activities. The moment is right not only to reassure ourselves that the safeguards of our Constitutional

rights and our civil liberties are firmly in place, but also to assure that we have balanced those guarantees against the practical imperative of maintaining the best intelligence arm of which we are capable.

It is not a perfect world. It is not an open world. It is a world in which we must balance idealism and realism. We must be sure that the check of accountability encourages idealism. We must also be sure that the check of accountability is made sufficiently flexible so that idealism can be tempered with realism. We are not there yet but we are moving strongly in the right direction. It is an exciting period, an important period in American intelligence. A period which we are, in effect, evolving a new uniquely American model of intelligence one tailored to values and standards of our society, and yet, one which is also designed to ensure that we remain exactly what we are today, the number one intelligence service in the world.

Thank you very much.

Indianapolis

I am very pleased to be here / and to share with you some of the significant new trends / that I see in the Intelligence process of our country today. / There are few intelligence institutions in history / that have undergone such thorough public scrutiny / as has the American intelligence community in the last five years, / particularly the Central Intelligence Agency. / There are few that could have survived such a fundamental shake up and overhaul. /

It is to the great credit of the exceptional people who make up that Agency, / that not only has it survived, / but is stronger, more capable today than ever before. / It is no less to the great credit of your senior Senator, Birch Bayh, / that the Congress has played such an important and constructive role in that rebuilding process. / Senator Bayh served on the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence in the 95th Congress / and now chairs that Committee in the 96th Congress. / He is a strong and enlightened leader / and one on whom I can depend to have done his homework, / to ask the piercing questions, / and to be fully supportive of measures which will strengthen the national security. / I will say more about the role of Senator Bayh's Committee a little later. /

Let me go back to ^athe fundamental problem that all of the past investigations and publicity ^{have} caused us--namely the keeping of our secrets.

The CIA is and should be our most secretive government agency. / The fact that it has been opened up to public scrutiny/has been a traumatic experience for those of us in the intelligence community. / It has damaged morale. / The typical intelligence officer/feels that he is performing a difficult, but patriotic task. / It often requires great sacrifice on his part. / When he finds that what he has done in good conscience / has been exposed by the media and severely criticized, / he can only feel that the country neither understands/nor appreciates his effort and his sacrifice. / That is a tragedy,/because intelligence professionals are very dedicated to you and to ^{our}their country. /

The trauma also makes the job which we are required by law to do / ^amore difficult / When adequate secrecy cannot be ensured, / foreigners who work on our behalf and support our country, / and foreign governments whose intelligence services complement ours / are certainly much less willing to do so. /

I need not emphasize to you in this audience / who have dedicated yourselves to patriotic support of our country / that we must be able to collect good intelligence all around the world. /

The world we live in is not the ideal ^{which} we would like it to be. / Most of it is neither open nor free. / More societies than not / are closed and totalitarian. / Not all countries are willing to tell us what they are going to do in advance, / even if their actions may severely impact on our interests. / With the newspapers full of news of the hostages in Iran, and the recent invasion of Afghanistan, / I know ^{that} I need not remind you of this. / *We have always needed good intell. I am suggesting that we need it more today than ever*

~~Thirty~~ Thirty two years ago, when the Central Intelligence Agency was founded, / we were the preeminent military power in the world. / We were totally independent economically, / and many if not most of the world's free nations took their political cues from us. / How different is today's world! / We are one of several interdependent economic powers. / We do not dominate the world's political scene ^{here}. Small nations and large are activist and independent. / We are much closer to military parity. / In these circumstances, / the leverage of knowing what is going on in the rest of the world / is much greater than it was in the days of economic, political, and military superiority. /

Yet, if we are going to have better intelligence, / we also must have the ability to keep national secrets. / How then do we resolve the contradiction / between the need for secrecy / and the danger of any secrecy to ^{open} free society? / Secrecy can lead to unidentified power. / Power in any form can be abused, / but unidentified power has a particular potential for abuse. / How then can we provide for good intelligence for our country / and yet insure against abuse? /

On the one hand we ^{will} can underreact / and simply assume that the relatively limited number of abuses of the past will not be repeated / because there are different people in government today, / and we ^{because} are more conscious of the problem. / On the other hand, we ^{could} can overreact / and apply such stringent controls over intelligence activities / ^{act} ~~that we~~ handcuff our intelligence effort out of business. / Either course would be shortsighted. / We need to achieve a balance. / The best way to achieve that balance is through a system of accountability; / accountability to the Legislative Branch of our government, / accountability to the Executive Branch, / and in addition, accountability to the American public. / We have found that we can do this ^{and} / in a way that does not handcuff ^{an} intelligence capability.

Let me explain, ^{first} ~~then~~ / how our intelligence accountability to the public has been structured / ~~and whether there is~~

~~adequate assurance that the intelligence function is being~~
~~carried out properly.~~ In the past, little intelligence
information was shared with the public, / so public
accountability was impossible. / Today that is no longer
true. / The public investigations, the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, and the perseverance of the press have all made
American intelligence much more accessible. / In addition,
over the past several years / we have made a deliberate
effort to be more open. / We are publishing more; / making
more intelligence analyses and estimates available to the
public. / My presence here with you, / something that
probably would not have taken place as recently as four or
five years ago, / is an earnest of that effort to keep you
informed. /

Yet, the public cannot know everything / if we are to
protect our necessary secrets. / Hence, we have constructed /
two systems of surrogates for the public / in overseeing
intelligence.

One is a series of accountability mechanisms in the
Executive Branch; / let me focus just on those around the
Presidency. / *DOB*

Today, the President is informed of sensitive
intelligence activities / and is required personally to
authorize any covert political action in writing. / And,
President Carter has very strongly supported the concept

that Congress must be adequately informed / so that it can carry out its oversight responsibilities. / This attitude is vital to the whole process of accountability. /

Also, the President has the Intelligence Oversight Board, / composed of three members from outside the government, / ^{who} which investigates all allegations of abuse or wrongdoing / which anyone may bring to them. / It reports only and directly to the President.

The other surrogate in the accountability process ^{Her} is the Congress. / Sometimes people are skeptical here, / feeling that the record of the Congress / is no better than that of the Executive Branch / in exercising control over intelligence activities. / Yet, the Congress is a body which is elected separately from the President / and which operates totally independently of the Executive Branch. / ~~Being~~ ^{fundes} accountable to two branches of government ^{is}, I think, a reinforcing assurance. / There are two committees in the Congress, / one in each chamber, / dedicated exclusively to the task of overseeing the intelligence process. /

One of these, of course, / is the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence which Senator Bayh chairs. / I can assure you that we are open and forthcoming with ^{to Senate} this committee; I can ^{also} assure you that Senator Bayh and his colleagues / are probing and thorough in reviewing our activities; and I can assure you that their questioning, / their guidance in advice and in

law/is helpful to us. / Accountability that is exercised properly/is healthy for any organization.

Accountability also must be internal, however. / It must ultimately start and end with the people who do the intelligence work. / Under the mandate of the President, ^{staff that guides the entire} I have reorganized both the CIA and the Intelligence Community ~~Staff~~ to strengthen them / and to assure improved internal controls. / Policies have been reshaped to conform with the changed national environment, ^{with the need for} more vigorous oversight, / and ^{with the} ~~demanding~~ ^{new} intelligence requirements. / Steps were taken, / such as the well-publicized and often criticized reductions in personnel, / to improve personnel management. The objective was to invigorate the organization and to preserve the dynamism and challenge / which have always attracted to the CIA / the best talent that this country has to offer. / Rather than purging the Agency of its ablest and most experienced hands, / as some allege, / this step opened up the top of the organization to new ideas, / greater flexibility, and a heightened sensitivity to the changed world in which we must work. / Plenty of able and experienced hands remain to lead the young chargers, / I assure you.

Having laid out for you the fundamental means of ensuring accountability, / the next logical question is, / does the necessary balance exist between accountability and the ability to conduct effective intelligence. / ~~I referred to this at the beginning of my remarks.~~

In his State of the Union address, several weeks ago, President Carter called for: /

"...clear and quick passage of a new charter to define the legal authority and accountability of our intelligence agencies. We will guarantee that abuses do not recur, but we must tighten our controls on sensitive intelligence information / and we need to remove unwarranted restraints on America's ability to collect intelligence." /

This is the fulfillment of the President's commitment to intelligence reform. / The ~~charters~~ he is asking the Congress to enact will do three things: / ^{if} they will delineate what we are authorized to do; what we are restricted from doing; and how the oversight process will check on how well we are doing ^{is} what ~~is~~ authorized and that we're not doing what ~~is~~ prohibited. / Senator Bayh and his committee have blazed the trail for the ~~charters~~ / and ~~just~~ th last week introduced charter legislation. / We all hope that the Congress will act on the ~~charter~~ ^{to} legislation rapidly. /

It is precisely because ~~the~~ ^{which} system of authorizations, restrictions, and oversight the President has championed over the past three years / has proven so successful, that the President and the Congress can now contemplate / lifting some

of the restraints on our intelligence activities. /
 Following the investigations of 1975 and 1976, / the government
 literally went overboard / in restraining intelligence agencies. /
 From the point of view of many that was necessary / since
 oversight and control mechanisms were not in place. / ^{then} Today
 they are. / Now there will be no ~~lessening of control~~, no
 danger in lifting some of the ~~debilitating~~ shackles / which
 now disadvantage American intelligence services. /

Let me cite four examples. / First, the Hughes-Ryan
 Amendment / requires as many as eight Congressional committees
 be briefed on every covert action. / Reducing that to just
 the two special intelligence committees / would diminish the
 risk of leaks which could endanger human life / without
 harming our accountability to the Congress. / Second, the
 Freedom of Information Act / ^{that for each request we must} requires ~~the detailed~~ review
~~of all CIA files to satisfy FOIA requests,~~ / including those
 which contain information from our most sensitive sources. /
 Limiting that review primarily to finished intelligence /
 would reassure important sources overseas / ^{because of that} who are becoming
 more reluctant to cooperate with us / ^{that there is no} ~~that~~ ^{their} identities will become public. / Third, the
^{fear that} discovery process in courts of law / can require us to reveal
 more sensitive, classified information in open court / ^{in order to} ~~to~~ prosecute an alleged espionage case / than was compromised
 in the first place by the accused. / Often, rather than

taking that risk, / the Government will choose not to prosecute. /

This form of "gray mail" could be prevented if protective rules were established / governing the use of classified

information / in espionage and other criminal cases. / And

finally, ^{we do not have adequate} the ~~absence of prohibiting~~ ^{to deal with scoundrels} legislation permits the ~~unauthorized disclosure~~ ^{individuals who deliberately} of information identifying ~~certain~~

U.S. intelligence officers, agents, informants, and sources. /

// conclusion Intelligence reform has taken place. / American intelligence services operate under the informed control of the elected representatives of the people / in both the Executive and Legislative Branches. / No one proposes that be changed. / However, today, we are moving closer to the enactment of permanent charters / which will formally legislate the authority and the limits of this country's intelligence activity. / The moment is right / not only to assure ourselves that the safeguards to constitutional rights / and civil liberties are firmly in place, / but that we have balanced these important guarantees / against the practical imperative of maintaining the best intelligence arm of which we are capable. /

Let me emphasize that the ^{which} constraints I have mentioned, ^{while they} are indeed a problem, ~~but~~ they have by no means hobbled us. ^{- yet} Our dedicated people have persevered despite them. / Without relief, however, / we all see some serious damage in the next few years, especially if we cannot redress our reputation ^{being able to} for not keeping secrets. *sm*

It is not a perfect world. / It is not an open world. /
It is a world in which we must balance idealism and realism /
in international affairs. / We must be sure that the check
of accountability encourages our idealism. / We must ensure
that the check of accountability is made sufficiently flexible /
so that idealism can be tempered with realism. / We are not
there yet, but we are moving strongly in the right direction. /
It is an exciting period, an important period in American
intelligence. / A period when we are, in effect, evolving
a new, uniquely American model of intelligence, / one tailored
to the values and standards of our society, / and yet, one
which is also designed to ensure that we remain what we are
today, / the number one intelligence service in the world. /

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